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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ably be suggested that the discrimination by Stuyvesant Town is well within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-EFFECT
OF STATE LEGISLATION COINCIDENTAL WITH FEDERAL
LEGISLATION ENACTED UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Respondents operated a travel bureau in Los Angeles, and received
commissions for arranging "share-expenses" passenger transportation in
private automobiles. They were prosecuted under a California statute' which
prohibits the sale or arrangement of any transportation over the public highways of the state if the transporting carrier has failed to obtain a permit from
either the Public Utilities Commission of California or the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States. Respondents demurred to the criminal complaint on the ground that since the Federal Motor Carrier Act 2
had substantially the same provision as the state statute, the state law entered
an exclusive Congressional domain. The appellate court upheld the respondents contention and ordered the complaint dismissed. On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, that the statute of California
is a lawful exercise of its police power, and since it does not conflict with the
Federal Motor Carrier Act, it is constitutional. People of State of California
v. Zook, 69 Sup. Ct. 841 (1949).
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens 3 the question was presented to the
Court, whether the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, 4 of itself, excluded all state regulation. It
was held that the mere grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce did not impliedly prohibit all state action. 5 The Supreme
Court recognized that there are matters of local concern which might never
be adequately dealt with by Congress, and 9 f necessity must be regulated by
the states even though their regulation unavoidably invoked some regulation
of interstate commerce. 6 Thus, a state may, in the exercise of its police power,
pass laws incidentally affecting interstate commerce. 7 They may not, however,
regulate local matters in such a way as to burden, 8 or discriminate 9 against
interstate commerce. Where the subject matter to be regulated is national in
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 654.1, 654,3 (Deering's 1947 Supp.)
2. 54 STAT. 919, 49 U. S C. § 301 (1946).
3. 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
4. U, S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8.
5. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra at 319.
6. See California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 113 (1941).
7. California v. Thompson, supra.
8. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros. Inc.. 303 U. S.
177 (1938).
9. Best v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940); Baldwin v.Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935).

CASES NOTED
character, or requires a uniform system of regulation, the state may not
regulate that subject even if Congress, has not, by legislation, entered the
field, as Congress by its inaction indicates that such commerce shall be free
from regulation.' 0 Congress may, however, by legislative act, confer upon
the states the power to regulate those subjects which, in the absence of such
permission could be regulated only by the federal government,"' Whenever
Congress passes an act by virtue of.an enumerated power, any state law in
conflict with this act of Congress becomes inoperative,' 2 since the Constitution expressly declares all laws made in pursuance of the Constitution to be
the supreme law of the land. 13 Under the Constitution,
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce is such that
cised it is exclusive, and ipso facto supersedes existing
the same subject, 14 whether consistent, complementary,

the power granted
when validly exerstate legislation on
coincidental, auxil-

iary, or otherwise.' 5
The principal case was concerned with a state statute which coincided
with a federal act, in that both the federal and state statutes regulated the
same local activity. If it was the intent of Congress to supersede the local
act, clearly that act could not stand, as unquestionably, Congress may redefine the areas of local and national predominance.' The Court, in concluding that Congress did not intend to override the state law, insisted that
it must find some conflict between the state and federal laws to justify the
presumption of such an intention. The cases cited by the Court in support
of this "conflict test" are plainly distinguishable from the principal case. One
case does not involve interstate or foreign commerce;1 another involves an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission expressly made effective at a
future date.'8 In still another case Congress expressly saved state laws not
10. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890).
11. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891) (this is not a delegation of legislative power
to the states, since the prior impediment to state action arose from the implied will of
Congress rather than a prohibition in the Constitution). But cf., Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920).
12. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
13. U. S. CONST. Art. VI.
14. Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana, 236 U. S. 439 (1915).
15. E.g., Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U. S. 57 (1934); International
Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1928); Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Porter, 273
U. S. 341 (1927); Chicago & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 272 U. S. 605
(1926) ; Oregon-Washington Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926) ;
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 250 U. S. 566 (1919); Charleston
& Western C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597 (1915) ; accord, Erie
R. R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671 (1914) (applying the same principle where the
federal regulation was not to become effective until a future time).
16. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 (1945).
17. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941) (holding the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act inoperative in view of the Federal Registration Act covering the same subject
matter).
18. H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939) (holding a state statute
regulating working hours of drivers of vehicles transporting property within the state
valid since an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing regulations over
the subject was not to become effective until a future time).
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in opposition to the federal act ;1D and in three cases the acts of Congress occupied only a limited field." o The "cqnflict test," adopted by the Court in the
instant case, had been invoked 21 in previous cases only when determining
whether Congress had intended to occupy a particular field, when such was
not apparent from a reading of the federal and state regulations. It could
hardly be contended that such a problem was presented to the Court in the
instant case, since the theory upon which the Court proceeded was that the
22
federal and state regulations were identical.
The effect of the Court's decision appears to be that the states may now
enact coincidental legislation, supplementing federal legislation enacted tinder
the commerce clause, though heretofore the jurisdiction of the federal government, in the field of commerce, when exercised, was deemed to be exclusive. In subsequent cases arising under the commerce clause, involving
state and federal regulations, the Court may rely upon the instant case as
authority to increase the regulatory power of the states in the field of interstate commerce. Should Congress desire to thwart this result, its intention
to supersede all existing state laws on the same subject will have to be expressly declared.

CORPORATE FINANCE-SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-GAIN
TO CORPORATE OFFICER WHO TOOK INCOME TAX DEDUCTION ON
SECURITIES DONATED TO CHARITIES HELD NOT A PROFITABLE SALE
Defendant, a director, received stock warrants under a contract of
employment with his corporation. Within six months he contributed the
unexercised warrants to bona-fide charitable organizations. Plaintiff, a
corporate stockholder, brought an action under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 1 for an accounting to the corporation of
profits realized by reason of defendant's income tax deductions taken
pursuant to such contributions. Held, on rehearing, that a donation by a
19. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 (1942) (holding a federal
statute providing that the importations of process butter shall be subject to the laws Vf
the state, indicates a Congressional purpose not to hinder the free exercise of state power
except as it may be inconsistent with federal legislation).
20. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 (1940) (holding valid a state law regulating
the weights of trucks since the Interstate Commerce Commission had only investigated
the need for such regulation) ; Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 (1937) (holding valid
a state law requiring the inspection of hulls and machinery of ships since there was no
federal regulation covering the particular subject) ; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346
(1933) (holding valid state regulation of cattle shipments from districts not regulated by
the Federal Quarantine Act).
21. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 (1937); Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
v. Railroad Commission, 283 U. S. 380 (1931) ; Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v.
Harris, 234 U. S. 412 (1914) ; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912).
22. People of State of California v. Zook, 69 Sup. Ct. 841, 845 (1949).
1. 48

STAT.

896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78p(b) (1946).

